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Abstract 
 
Competitive tendering of local public transport services has been allowed in Norway since 1994. By 
2005, 28 percent of all route production in Norway was procured on the basis of tendered contracts, 
covering around 40 percent of all passengers. The majority of the tendered contracts were gross cost 
contracts, whereas historically, most Norwegian contracts have been net cost contracts. This article 
analyses the effect of competitive tendering on operating cost and subsidies paid. It is found that 
competitive tendering reduces costs by 10 percent and that most of the cost reduction has been used to 
reduce subsidies for public transport by local authorities. The effects of competitive tendering in Norway 
are smaller compared to other countries. This can be attributed to the fact that the industry had improved 
efficiency over a long period before competitive tendering was introduced. 
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Introduction  
 
Competitive tendering is now a well-established practice for procurement of public 
transport (PT) services in several European countries, and is continuously spreading to 
further areas. Its popularity is partly related to its success to deliver cost-efficient 
production, even though later developments cast doubts on whether these efficiency 
gains are sustainable in the longer run. Moreover, the efficiency gains provided through 
the first-time tendering process seem highly dependent on variations in previous 
contractual arrangements and whether or not there has been a public, in-house 
production unit. Explanations of efficiency gains from competitive tendering in 
different areas must take into account the context in which the tendering process has 
taken place. In that respect, the level of efficiency before tendering is introduced to a 
large extent limits the potential gain from actually introducing tendering.  
This article examines the effects of competitive tendering in Norway on cost and 
subsidy levels. In Norway, local public transport lies under the jurisdiction of 19 county 
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councils. Until 1986, a part of the framework-funding scheme for local authorities was 
earmarked for PT services. In 1986, such earmarking was removed, allowing local 
authorities to freely prioritise between PT and other services under their jurisdiction. 
This created a strong focus on the costs of PT operation.  
PT service production has traditionally been procured through negotiated net cost 
contracts with private or semi-private (publicly owned) operators. Public in-house 
production has been limited to the major cities. Due to this, a majority of the Norwegian 
bus industry has been fully or partly on private hands, to a large extent combined with 
the market initiative of net-cost agreements. This implies that there was a great deal of 
private interests in the bus industry even prior to the 1994-directive, which permitted the 
use of tendering by law. The 1994-directive, together with reduced state funds for 
transport and communication purposes within the framework-funding scheme, brought 
about a rising use of competitive tendering during the late 1990s. In 2005, 28 percent of 
all route production in Norway was procured on the basis of tendered contracts, 
covering around 40 percent of all passengers. Nevertheless, negotiated contracts still 
constitute the majority of all local bus contracts in Norway. 
The main question this article sets out to answer is; what are the cost savings of 
competitive tendering for Norwegian procuring authorities? The analysis is based on an 
recent evaluation of competitive tendering in Norwegian local bus transport, where 
analysis of quantitative data over a 15 year period are combined with a qualitative 
assessment of different contractual arrangements both for tendered services and for 
services not tendered as a control group (Bekken et al 2006). The analysis presented in 
this article is primarily based on the quantitative data set, even though the results are 
interpreted by using the qualitatively obtained information. 
 
Background and hypothesis 
 
Competitive tendering refers to a situation where the state allows other legal entities 
to compete for the right to carry out a task that the state traditionally has carried out 
itself or purchased directly by means of negotiated contracts (Longva et al 2005). 
Hence, competitive tendering differs significantly from free competition and does not 
necessarily imply privatisation of the businesses. Both Denmark (Copenhagen) and 
Sweden were quick off the mark with competitive tendering for local bus services and 
created the basis for what is often referred to as the Scandinavian model in such 
contexts (van de Velde 2005 and 2004). This means that the authorities are responsible 
for drawing up the public transport service, which is then purchased from private/public 
legal companies through a tendering process. Even though Norwegian authorities show 
a growing interest in implementing incentive contracts within the tendering regime, the 
“Scandinavian model” is still the dominant form in Norway as well (Longva et al 2005).  
Evidence from the Scandinavian countries supports the general view that competitive 
tendering is associated with cost savings for the procuring body, at least on a short-term 
basis. In Sweden, competitive tendering was introduced in 1989. Previously, most 
service production was run by public companies, either on the basis of in-house 
production or procured through negotiated gross cost contracts. However, in 2001 95 
percent of services had been subject to competitive tendering at least once, and now 
private operators dominated the market (Alexandersson and Pyddoke 2003). National 
data for the period 1987-1993 indicated unit cost reductions due to competitive 
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tendering of around 13 percent, later re-estimated to an isolated effect of 6-7 percent 
(Alexandersson et al 1998). Figures from Stockholm and Helsingborg indicate even 
greater unit cost reductions on a short-time basis, in the range of 20-30 percent (Nilsson 
et al 2005, Nilsson et al 2003, Jansson 2002 and Reiter 2002).  
In the longer run, however, the efficiency gains seem to have halted in Sweden. 
Recent data show little further reduction in unit costs since the mid-1990s. Moreover, 
data from larger urban areas even indicate rising cost levels in the third and fourth round 
of tendering (Nilsson et al 2005, Jansson 2002). The costs are nevertheless still below 
their initial levels, even though they encompass much higher service standards. 
Alexandersson and Pyddoke (2003) largely confirm this picture on a nationwide basis. 
They have updated the data set initially presented in Alexandersson et al (1998). The 
period of rising share of tendered services (1989 to 2001) coincides with steadily falling 
cost levels, at least until 1999. In the years 2000 and 2001 costs were increasing, but 
still way below the level of 1989. Consequently, the isolated cost saving effect of 
tendering is a bit smaller than in their initial study, but still significant.   
In Denmark a 1990-legislation imposed a requirement for competitive tendering on all 
bus services, which was gradually implemented in the period up to 2002. Private 
operators replaced the previous market dominance of public operators. In Copenhagen, 
unit costs were reduced by about 24 percent in the period 1990-1997 (HUR 2001). As in 
Sweden, however, later rounds of tendering have shown increasing costs, partly due to 
rising service standards. Similar developments are also found in England (ATCO, 
2004). Nevertheless, unit costs are still below the pre-tendering levels (HUR 2005).  
These Scandinavian experiences mirror Wallis and Hensher's (2005) conclusion from 
investigations of tendering-effects in urban bus services from 10 developed countries, 
covering more than 20 cities. Based on evidence from research conducted in Great 
Britain, Scandinavia, USA, Australia and New Zealand, the authors conclude that short-
run cost savings from competitive tendering vary from 5 to 50 percent. As a crude “rule 
of thumb” the authors suggest indicative cost savings of 30 percent from competitive 
tendering on a short-run basis. These cost-savings find further support in a review of 
European experiences in Longva et al (2005). They argue that such cost effects occur 
from competition irrespective of the tendering procedures and contractual clauses 
actually chosen. 
As pinpointed in the studies referred to above, numerous factors will influence the 
differences in results between the different countries and areas. One main factor seems 
to be that of the pre-competitive tendering situation, defined by historical contractual 
clauses and ownership structure. As opposed to their Scandinavian partners, previously 
dominated by public operators running on negotiated gross cost contracts, Norway has a 
tradition for granting the subsidies on a net cost basis to operators operating on long-
termed concessions given for an area or a single route, except for the capital area of 
Oslo, the operators were all private right incorporated companies, often with private 
shareholders only (Johansen 1999). This Norwegian combination of net cost contracts 
and private operators is rather unique in international terms (Johansen et al 2000). 
Consequently, the supposed effect of privatisation per se seems less prominent in 
Norway. 
Over the period 1986-96 unit costs for the Norwegian bus industry as a whole were 
estimated to have reduced at the range 6-20 percent, whilst tendering contracts still only 
attributed to around 2 percent of the service production (Johansen 1999). Much cost 
saving was in other words already achieved before competitive tendering became an 
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influential force in Norway. These cost reductions seem more attributable to the threat 
of competitive tendering and the change from an earmarked funding scheme to a more 
free funding scheme rather than the use of competitive tendering itself. It must also be 
mentioned that so-called “normalised cost contracts” with “efficiency agreements” has 
been widely used. Such contracts require the operator to improve efficiency by a certain 
percent by deducting this from the general price increase of the “normalised costs 
contracts”. Such contracts are still influential in Norway, as only 28 percent of the 
services were procured on the basis of competitive tendering in 2005 (Bekken et al 
2006). The cost reductions prior to the rising share of competitive tendering leads us to 
an expectation of lower cost saving potential in Norway than elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
some cost savings for the procuring authorities should be expected, at least when it 
comes to unit costs, partly as a result of competition itself and partly as a result of the 
move from net cost contracts to gross cost contracts.  
The procuring authorities introduced gross cost contracts at the same time as 
competitive tendering was introduced. While net cost contracts constituted 90 percent of 
all services that were procured on a negotiated basis in Norway in 2005, gross cost 
contracts constituted 96 percent of the tendered ones (Bekken et al 2006). Even though 
Norwegian authorities show growing interest in implementing financial incentives 
within the gross cost framework, the corresponding higher risks endured by the operator 
are rarely compensated with greater freedom of design (Bekken et al 2006). Hence, the 
growing use of incentive contracts does not alter the fact that competitive tendering in 
Norway has brought about a shift in market responsibility from the operator to the 
authorities, mirroring the move from a net cost to a gross cost subsidy regime. Service 
and quality levels previously approved by local authorities on the basis of the operators’ 
initiative, are now increasingly being pre-defined by the authorities as part of the 
procurement process. Costs in terms of route planning, quality assessments, market 
research and market risk are thus being transferred as well. Parts of the cost-saving 
effects from first round of tendering may therefore be attributed to transfer of costs and 
risk rather than efficiency improvements.  
To summarise, the following findings for Norway will be expected from competitive 
tendering: (i) The higher share of competitive tendering, the lower costs for the 
procuring authorities, (ii) The initial cost reductions will however be lower in Norway 
than experienced elsewhere (as in Sweden and Denmark), and (iii) The move from 
negotiated net cost contracts to gross cost tendering leads to subsidy reductions rather 
than service improvements and increased service levels. 
 
Data sources and model specifications 
 
The data used for the analyses consists of pooled time series of key indicators for 
public transport from each of the 19 Norwegian counties. The data set covers the period 
from 1986 to 2005 (forecast), although the time series are fairly complete only from 
1992 to 2005. That is from 3 years before the first tendered buss service in Norway. 
Because some of the time series are incomplete for individual data and counties, some 
ratios (like subsidy as proportion of costs) are only obtainable from a few counties in 
the last five years.  
The data set has been quality assured in two ways. First, each of the counties has had 
the opportunity to comment, explain and update their data. Second, we have checked the 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 33 (2006): 29-40 
 33
data for large or inexplicable variations from year to year, and removed data, which are 
obviously erroneous. In some cases incorrect data have been replaced with interpolated 
values. There will inevitably still be some errors in the data set, which relate in 
particular to some of the older data. However, the database is the best available historic 
data for local public transport in Norway. Table 1 summarises key figures in the data set 
for 1991 and 2004. 
Table 1: Key figures of the data set. Monetary values in fixed 2004 NOKs (€1≈NOK8). 
 1991 2004 
 Lowest Mean Highest Lowest Mean Highest 
Proportion tendered services* 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 20 % 100 % 
Subsidy as proportion of costs** 30 % 41 % 80 % 18 % 37 % 60 % 
Cost/veh.km, NOK 14,2 20,5 42,3 16,0 19,1 23,1 
Average fare, NOK*** 8,2 13,0 16,2 10,1 14,3 18,2 
* Proportion of produced kilometres subjected to competitive tendering 
** Year 2000 data used instead of 2004  
*** One county with exceptionally high fare levels has been excluded 
 
Three econometric models are specified in order to isolate the effect of competitive 
tendering on total costs, cost per vehicle kilometre and total subsidy, respectively. OLS 
regression is used to correct for the influence of other variables that affect costs and 
subsidy levels. OLS is a sufficiently appropriate approach for the purpose of isolating 
the effects of tendering from the effects of other factors when we have pooled time 
series data. OLS estimation is a simple estimation procedure, which also provides 
simple interpretation of parameters. Further, it also facilitates comparison with the 
Swedish study of Alexandersson et al. (1998), who used OLS. The limitations of OLS 
models concern in particular the inability to estimate models that are intrinsically 
nonlinear in their parameters – an issue beyond the scope of this study – and problems 
with truncated variables. It is unlikely, however, that the choice of estimation procedure 
will affect the overall findings of the study, although it may produce different estimates 
especially of the extreme cases.  
Whereas Alexandersson et al. (1998) in a similar study specified models with 
extensive use of variables representing changes in lagged, lead and current levels of 
tendering, which neither produced many significant parameters nor readily interpretable 
estimates, we have kept the models simple, the number of explanatory variables low and 
focused on those model specifications that produce robust estimates.  
The following model specifications will be used. They are the result of several model 
runs where different specifications were tested: 
 
1. K = β0 + β1*VKM + β2*PAX + β3*Ddiesel + β4*Tender  
2. VK =  β0 + β1*VKM + β2*PAX + β3*Ddiesel + β4*Tender  
3. T =  β0 + β1*VKM + β2*PAX + β3*Ddiesel + β4*Tender + β5*POP 
 
Where: 
K is total cost * 
VK is cost per vehicle kilometre * 
T is subsidy paid by the County * 
VKM is vehicle kilometres produced * 
PAX is the number of passengers per year* 
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Ddiesel is a dummy for diesel duty, which was introduced in 1999 
Tender is the proportion of route production is subjected to competitive tendering 
POP is population density * 
β are the parameters to be estimated (β0 is the constant term in the equation) 
 
All monetary values are transformed to 2004 prices, using the retail price index. 
Variables marked with an asterisk (*) are log-transformed using the natural logarithm. 
Their parameter estimates are therefore readily interpretable as (constant) elasticities. 
The variable "Tender" is not log-transformed. The interpretation of the effect of 
competitive tendering is therefore that one unit (percentage point) increase in the route 
production subject to competitive tendering increases K, VK and T with a factor of β4. 
Our a priori expectations are 1) that β1 has a positive sign in model 1 and 3, i.e. 
increased route production increases cost and subsidy levels. In case of scale economies 
β1 will be negative in equation 2; 2) that β2 and β3 are positive; and 3) that β3 is 
negative, i.e. competitive tendering reduces costs and subsidies. 
An important structural difference between the counties is the degree of urbanisation. 
While some counties are largely rural, others – notably Oslo – are predominantly urban. 
The variable POP is included to correct for this. 
 
Empirical findings 
 
Figure 1 shows the developments in operating costs and subsidies paid by county 
councils to public transport operators. The figure also indicates the timing of key events 
that have influenced cost and subsidy levels. 
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Figure 1: Developments in average cost per vehicle-kilometre and subsidies. Index 1991=1.00. Fixed 
prices. 
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when the curves flatten off. It is evident that the developments in subsidy payments 
follow the developments in costs. However, the fluctuations in subsidy payments are 
significantly larger than the variation in costs. This is partly due to the fact that 
subsidies typically are about 30 percent of costs, making changes in subsidies related to 
changes in costs by a factor of three. 
The cost and subsidy reductions started before the Transport Act was set in force in 
1994. Several explanations can be offered. The change of financing scheme of the 
county councils from earmarked to framework funding in 1986, implied that the 
counties had to prioritise between public transport and policy areas like health and 
education. Moreover, it has been argued that the cost reductions were a result of 
operators preparing themselves for the competitive tendering regime that was to come 
(Carlquist and Fearnley, 2001). Central government transfers to county councils were 
then reduced every year from 1995 to 1999 due to the expected efficiency gains in local 
public transport that would arise from competitive tendering.  
Prior to 1999, bus services were exempted from the diesel duty. From 1999 this 
exemption was replaced by a reimbursement scheme. On average the compensation has 
been somewhere around 95% of the diesel duty. Our analyses do not exclude costs and 
subsidies that relate to this tax. It is therefore evident from figure 1 that costs and 
subsidies increased in 1999. 
In 2004, a VAT reform was set in force. This reform subjected local public transport 
in Norway to value added tax (VAT). The VAT was set at 6 percent, but with full 
deduction of input VAT at 24 percent. In reality this was therefore an indirect way of 
state subsidies to local public transport services, which was also the expressed purpose. 
 
 
Do half-way solutions result in poorer performance? 
 
As an initial attempt to identify possible effects of competitive tendering in the data 
material, we have grouped the 19 Norwegian counties according to their use, or 
determination to introduce, competitive tendering. Three categories are identified:   
1. Predominantly tendered contracts: Counties with more than 50 percent 
competitively tendered bus mileage and/or decision to increase use of competitive 
tendering (4 counties). 
2. Mixture: Less than 50 percent competitively tendered bus mileage or use of 
negotiated contracts with explicit threat of tendering or decision to introduce tendering 
(7 counties). 
3. Predominantly pre-negotiated contracts: No tendering and no intention to introduce 
competitive tender (7 counties). 
By comparing these three groups of counties we get a first impression of their relative 
performance (table 2). 
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Table 2: Change between 1991 and 2005 in counties with predominantly tendered services, a mixture of 
tendered and pre-negotiated contracts and predominantly pre-negotiated contracts, respectively. 
 Predominantly tendered 
contracts 
Mixture Predominantly pre-
negotiated contracts 
Trips/capita +18% -7% +18% 
Route production +4 % -17 % +13 % 
Cost/veh. km -18% +15% +1% 
Subsidy/cost +12% +26% +10% 
Average fare +8% +1% +5% 
 
This preliminary comparison clearly shows that counties, which have chosen a regime 
with a mixture of tenders and pre-negotiated contracts, have performed poorly relative 
to those, which to a greater extent have chosen one or the other. We see from table 2 
that route production has been reduced substantially despite large subsidy increases in 
the "mixture" group. Operating costs per vehicle-kilometre have also increased 
considerably in this group. The result is loss of passengers, quite opposite the 
achievements in the two other groups of counties.  
The comparison can also be interpreted in terms of market orientation. Typically, 
passengers place more emphasis on improved service levels than on fare reductions 
(Carlquist and Fearnley, 2001). While the "mixture" group has kept fare levels more or 
less unchanged at the expense of reduced service levels and higher subsidy 
requirements, the two other groups have increased fares in order to finance service 
improvements. The latter approach is therefore more market oriented, and, as opposed 
to the "mixture" group, has resulted in increased patronage. 
The threat of tendering, which should be most present in the "mixture" group, seems 
not to have had any dampening effect on costs or subsidies. Rather, this preliminary 
presentation of the data suggests a less straightforward pattern of relationship between 
competitive tendering and threat of competitive tendering on the one hand, and cost 
performance on the other. 
Obviously, our division of county types is somewhat arbitrary, and hides other 
structural differences between the groups. For example, counties in the first group have 
larger populations, more passengers and higher operating cost than the others. In the 
next section, therefore, we enhance the analytical approach by isolating the effects of 
competitive tendering from other factors that influence performance. 
 
 
Tenders have reduced costs and subsidies 
 
We have estimated models for total costs, costs per bus kilometre and subsidies, as 
described above. Competitive tendering is among the explanatory variables in each 
model. The chosen model specifications are the results of several model runs in which 
different explanatory variables have been tested. In addition to sign, size and 
significance level of parameter estimates, we have preferred simple models rather than 
models with large numbers of explanatory variables as long as the overall performance 
of the models is maintained. For example, population density was found to replace 18 
county dummies relatively well, and thus preferred. Table 3 summarises the model 
outputs. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 33 (2006): 29-40 
 37
Table 3: Model summaries 
Variable Total cost 
model 
Cost per bus kilometre 
model 
Total subsidy 
model 
Vehicle kilometre 0.90 ** -0.10 ** 0.80 ** 
Passenger number 0.17 ** 0.17 ** 0.10 * 
Diesel duty 7.1 % ** 6.1 % ** 26 % ** 
Population density     -0.07 ** 
Percent competitive tendering  -0.1 % * -0.1 % * -0.7 % ** 
Adj R2 = 0.94 0.94 0.50 0.62 
* Significant 10 % level 
**  Significant 5 % level 
 
The effect of competitive tendering is stable in all models. Competitive tendering 
contributes to a reduction in both costs and subsidies. Our calculations show that a 1 per 
cent increase in route production open to competition reduces costs by 0.1 per cent. In 
other words, competitive tendering reduces costs by approximately a tenth. A move 
from no competitive tendering to full competitive tendering will provide cost savings of 
approximately 10 percent.  
According to our model estimate, one percentage point increase in the use of 
competitive tendering reduces the need for subsidies by 0.7 per cent. Given the fact that 
subsidies only cover a fraction of the costs (typically a third) and that the county 
councils have good opportunities to reap the majority of the cost saving in connection 
with tenders, tenders have a greater effect on the level of subsidises than on costs. In 
addition, as we have shown in table 2 above, fare levels have increased faster in 
counties with competitive tendering, contributing to further reductions in subsidy 
requirements. 
This means both that tenders have resulted in more cost-effective production and that 
the savings have to a large extent been taken out in the form reduced subsidies rather 
than improved service levels.  
 
 
Conclusion and discussion  
 
The main aim of this article has been to analyse the effect of competitive tendering on 
operating cost and subsidies. The article has put forward two important conclusions. 
First, exposure to competition has up to now contributed to cost effectiveness, which in 
turn has made it possible to reduce subsidies. At the same time, reduced subsidies have 
also been a driving force behind the use of competitive tendering. Second, counties that 
have chosen a regime with a mixture of tenders and negotiated contracts appear to have 
experienced a less favourable development than those that to a larger extent have 
chosen one over the other. 
 
 
Tenders have reduced costs and subsidies, but less than in other countries 
 
As mentioned, we have found that tenders contribute to a reduction in both costs and 
subsidies. Our calculations show that competitive tendering reduces operating costs by 
10 percent. A 1 per cent increase in production open to competition reduces the need for 
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subsidies by 0.7 per cent. In other words, tenders have resulted in more cost effective 
production, and the savings have been taken out in the form of reduced subsidies, rather 
than enhanced level of service. 
Compared with international experiences, the cost saving effect from competitive 
tendering in Norway is on the lower scale. This is not to say that competitive tendering 
has been less successful in Norway compared to other places. The result is due to the 
fact that the industry had improved the effectiveness substantially already before 
competitive tendering was introduced. Thus, one should consider the context in depth 
before jumping to conclusions on the success of competitive tendering. 
There are, however, also reasons to cast a critical glance at our a priori hypothesis of 
massive cost transfers occurring as a consequence of the shift from net cost to gross cost 
contracts. A closer examination of previous net cost contracts reveals that actual 
passenger incentives and income risks are smaller than initially assumed. As shown in 
Bekken et al (2006) the negotiated net cost contracts in Norway often encompass 
clauses that allow for renegotiation of the contract if the passenger revenue is 
significantly higher or lower than the revenue from the previous year. Moreover, the 
subsidy level is negotiated on a year-to-year basis, putting even further limits to the 
effect on passenger incentives inherent in the net cost contracts. When the new tender 
contracts are increasingly supplemented with patronage incentives and associated risks, 
while being of a significantly longer duration, the differences in the actual income, risk 
and investment structures – and thus the transfer of costs from the operator to the 
authority – become less. This is further strengthened by the fact that increasing use of 
incentive contracting in Norway is rarely accompanied with increasing room for design 
manoeuvring for the operator, restricting his options when it comes to risk 
diversification.  
At the same time, effects and challenges experienced by the counties in the transition 
from a direct purchase regime to competitive tendering will vary from one county to 
another - from one context to another. This is partly due to the fact that the forms of 
competition and contracts which are introduced under the new regime will vary between 
counties according to the degree of exposure to competition and also because the form 
of the contracts which they are giving up will vary from county to county. Altogether, 
this calls for further nuances when it comes to how large (or small) effects can be 
expected from the introduction of tenders in each individual county. In many ways, the 
national level appears to be too broad.  
 
 
Does tendering have any adverse effects? 
 
One of our main findings were that counties that have chosen a regime with a mixture 
of tenders and negotiated contracts appear to have experienced a less favourable 
development than counties that to a larger extent have chosen one over the other. One 
explanation for this striking difference in performance can be related to the fact that the 
introduction of competitive tendering reduces the reliability of dialogue in pre-
negotiated contracts, so that the operators adapt to a competitive situation even though 
their contract is not immediately exposed to competition. Additionally, it is the case that 
areas with the greatest potential for cost reductions are first put out to tender.  
The threat of competitive tenders may thus have two rather opposite effects, 
depending on the context in which they are implemented. On the one hand, the threat 
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creates pressures to make the business more efficient. This was clearly apparent in 
Norway through the effectiveness agreements prior to competitive tendering. On the 
other hand, however, threats of tendering may weaken the long-lasting trust relationship 
between one particular operator and the purchaser. This is of particular importance in 
those cases where previous production was sustained by so-called high-trust 
relationships and incomplete contracts (Longva and Osland 2005). The introduction of 
competitive tendering in one part of the county may thus create unclear operator-
purchaser relationships in the remaining parts that still rely on negotiated net cost 
contracts with heavy risk bearing and market responsibility for the operator. The mere 
existence of a threat of tendering will inevitably make the prolongation of the contract 
less likely, leading the operator to keep more in terms with the actual length of the 
contract as described by its formal clauses. Consequently, the operator’s horizon of 
investments will be shortened, and with annual negotiations this results in a very 
shortsighted focus on costs, and discourages long-term investments and other long-term 
commitments.  
All of this suggests that there is a danger inherent in the threat of competition which 
over time can make the threat less useful when it comes to cost reduction. New 
contractual clauses and role diversification are therefore necessary in the none-tendered 
parts of the county as well, making them more in line with their new relational context, 
even on a negotiated basis.  
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